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WATER FOR RECREATION: A PLEA
FOR RECOGNITION
INTRODUCTION

T

he State of Colorado has reason to be concerned with the allocation of water resources in order that the use thereof will not be
denied for recreational purposes. The importance of the recreational
use of water both to Colorado residents and to its tourist industry is
indicated by a survey of various statistics. In 1965 alone 416,793
resident and non-resident fishing and combination fishing and small
game licenses were sold' bringing in a revenue of $1,838,559.2
$69,176,055.23 was spent by resident and non-resident fishermen in
Colorado in the same year.3 In 1966, 462,337 fishermen spent nearly
twenty-five million hours fishing in Colorado. 4 Of a total of 31 state
parks and recreation areas, only two are non-water oriented." In
1966, 1,871,843 persons attended these parks and recreation areas.6
These figures cannot but emphasize the importance to the people
of Colorado of the state's water resources and their desirability for
recreational use. It becomes important to inquire into what action
can be taken to insure that water will be available in the future for
recreational use. The importance of the issue is increased by the fact
that in normal, non-drought years, Colorado water at least in the
Arkansas, South Platte and Rio Grande basins is already overappropriated.7
In its constitution, adopted in 1876, Colorado declared its
adherence to the appropriation system of allocating water resources. 8
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated,
within the state of Colorado, is hereby dedared to be the property
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5
1Colo.

Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Game Management Div., Economic Value of Hunting & Fishing to the People of the State of Colorado - 1965, March 31, 1966.
Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Information & Education Div., Fact Finder, April
16, 1967.
5 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Fish Management Div., Colo. Park and Recreation
2

System.

6 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Information & Education Div., Fact Finder, April
16, 1967.
7 Interview With Colorado Deputy State Engineer, William R. Smith, in Denver, Colo.,
April 10, 1967.
8 The appropriation system has been adopted by most of the arid western states. SAX,
WATER LAW 1 (1965). This system permits a user to obtain a right to water without the necessity of owning or occupying the land adjacent to the surface stream or
lake as is required under the riparian system.
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The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation
shall give the better right as between those using the water for the
same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same,
those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those
using the same for manufacturing purposes.
Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6
The constitutional provisions raise the major issue with which

this note is concerned: whether or not water for recreational uses
can be appropriated. The possibility of appropriating water for
recreation is first discussed as though there were adequate supplies

of water available for appropriation. The subsequent portion of the
paper is devoted to a discussion of the need for compensation if
unappropriated waters are unavailable, and to the desirability of a
permit system as such a system would relate to the preservation of
water for recreational use.
I.

APPROPRIATION OF WATER FOR RECREATIONAL USE

The elements traditionally recognized as being necessary to
accomplish an appropriation of water are a declared intent to use
the water for a beneficial use, a diversion of the water from the
stream, and an application of the water to the intended use within a

reasonable time. The problems posed for a recreational use by the
required elements are the scope of "beneficial use" and the need for
a diversion.
A. Beneficial Use

The requirement of a beneficial use is explicitly stated in the
Colorado Constitution.' ° The Colorado Supreme Court decisions
have consistently recognized the necessity for a beneficial use." The
problem arises in defining the scope of beneficial use in order to
discover whether or not a recreational use of water is within that
scope. The Colorado Constitution does not provide that definition,
but instead merely names three possible uses and arranges them in a
hierarchy, giving use for domestic purposes precedence over agricultural use, and agricultural use priority over water use for manu9

KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 227-28, 242, 246-50, 252 (1894); SAX, WATER

LAW 10 (1965).
10
Art. XVI, § 6.
"See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351,
79 P.2d 373 (1938) ; Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 109 Pac. 748 (1910) ; Farmers'
High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 Pac. 1028 (1889).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

facturing.' Several states have expressly declared, by statute, that
recreation is a beneficial use.' 8 On March 9, 1966, the General
Assembly of Colorado approved an act to prevent and control water
pollution and for the first time mentioned "recreation" as a beneficial
use."4 By statute Colorado has also stated that the use of water for
private and public bathing establishments is beneficial.' "
There is no Colorado Supreme Court case which would indicate
definitively that that court would consider a recreational use of water
beneficial. Some cases seem to assume that the constitution intended
an economic use when it used the word beneficial.' 8 Other cases
emphasize the idea of economic in the sense that the use be not
wasteful.' 7 Under either interpretation a recreational use could be
justified.
In a case that was subsequently overruled, but on different
grounds, the Colorado Federal District Court held that recreation
is a beneficial use.'" In that case, the Cascade Town Company sued
to enjoin the defendant power company from storing water in
reservoirs and piping it down the mountain, taking the water from
the creek from which the plaintiff derived its water source. The
defendant's action would dry up the creek which flowed through
the plaintiff's property and destroy a waterfall which created luxuriant vegetation from its spray and mist. The plaintiff had spent a
significant amount of money to improve the area as a resort. The
trial court decided that the plaintiff's use of the water to promote
an environment conducive to rest and relaxation was beneficial and,
on this basis, granted the injunction. The Eighth Circuit, on appeal,
reversed the district court's ruling.' 9 Although the appellate court
agreed that the promotion of rest and relaxation is a beneficial
use,20 it interpreted the lower court decision as being based on an
§ 6. It has been noted that the drafters of the Colorado Constitution probably intended a "true preference," i.e., a use not necessitating compensation if displacing an inferior use, but the Colorado court has held compensation
necessary. THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 12425 (Haber & Bergen ed. 1958).

12 COLO. CoNT. art. XVI,

§ 67-4301 to -4305 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707
(1964) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 577 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 536.310
(1965); TEx. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7471 (Vernon 1964).
14 Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 1, at 199.
13 IDAHO CODE ANN.

15 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 148-2-3 (1963).

10Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933) (water diverted for commercial
propagation of fish is beneficial use); cf. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake
Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 Pac. 729 (1908) '(fish propagation not beneficial

use).
17 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908);
Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 48 Pac. 532 (1896).
18 Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011, 1017-18 (D. Clo.
1910), rev'd on other grounds, 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
9
1 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).

20

Id. at 128.
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appropriation for irrigation. The circuit court found that the trial
court's emphasis on the artistic beauty of the waterfall resulted in
that court's overlooking the effectiveness of the plaintiff's use of the
water as compared with more customary methods of irrigation. The
appellate court felt utility, not beauty, was the dominant idea of the
lawmakers and therefore the Cascade Town Company could not
claim all of the water unless it was efficiently using all of it."'
Since we are without any clear judicial pronouncement establishing recreation as a beneficial use, it is to be hoped that the legislature
will, at the next opportunity, reinforce its intent as expressed in the
1966 water pollution act and declare recreation to be a beneficial
use within the broad scheme of water appropriations.
B. Diversion
Another element often considered necessary to complete an
appropriation of water is that of a diversion. The term "diversion"
contemplates a taking of the water from the stream so that it may
be applied to the intended beneficial use. The cases in which insistance on a diversion is made require, for the most part, some
affirmative act of the appropriator.2 2 Thus, the cases are referring
not to a natural diversion, but to a mechanical one. However, Colorado cases are far from uniform in requiring a diversion. In the early
case of Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe23 the
state contended that since the constitution recognized appropriation
24
by diversion, it thereby excluded appropriation without a diversion.
The state brought a quo warranto proceeding to obtain the forfeiture
of the company's corporate franchise claiming that the company could
not use the bed of a non-navigable natural stream as a reservoir.
The court, in refusing to uphold the state's claim, declared that an
appropriation requires no immediate diversion. Rather, said the court,
the true test of an appropriation is the successful application of the
water to a beneficial use and the method of distribution or diversion
is immaterial. 2 The court adopted the California Supreme Court's
definition of appropriation as "the intent to take, accompanied by
some open, physical demonstration of the intent and for some
valuable use.' '2 The Colorado court added that the appropriation is
legally completed when the act evidencing the intent is performed,
21Id. at

129.
See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130
Colo. 375, 386, 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (1954); Board of County Corn'rs v. Rocky
Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 378 (1938).
238 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794 (1885).
22

24Id. at 616, 9 Pac. at 796.
2"
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
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noting that the act must be followed up within a reasonable amount
of time,2 7 i.e., steps must be taken to apply the water to the intended
beneficial use. Numerous other cases have followed the example of
Larimer in stating that an appropriation of water does not require
28
a diversion.
Other cases insist just as strongly that a diversion is essential. 9
A recent case in which the requirement of a diversion defeated the
plaintiff's claim to water rights is ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co."° In this case, the district
claimed water rights under a Colorado statute which gave the district
the power to hold for the public use enough water of any natural
3
stream to maintain a stream flow for the preservation of fish. '
The trial court dismissed the district's claim and the supreme court
affirmed basing its decision on the necessity of a diversion.32 Surprisingly enough in view of the above discussion, the supreme court
added that the legislature could not have intended to depart so
radically from established doctrine by not requiring a diversion and
that therefore the statute worked no such departure.3 3 Although the
case was decided as if the plaintiff were attempting to establish a
right to the use of water, the statute might have been viewed as an
exercise of the police power and this would not involve the question
of appropriation.
The most probable reason for the elusiveness of the requirement
of diversion is that, in most cases, in order to use the water, it must
be taken from the stream. In an early treatise, Kinney stated that the
theory of the appropriation system is based upon a prior possessory
right and that no possession or exclusive property could be obtained
without diverting the water from its natural channel.3 4 The unusual
case is that of the Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
Rocky Mountain Power Co. 5 in which a stream flow was desired to
be maintained without any need for taking the water from the stream.
27

Id. at 617, 9 Pac. at 796.

28

Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011, 1018 (D. Colo.
1910), rev'd on other grounds, 205 Fed. 123, 129 '(8th Cir. 1913) ; Town of Genoa
v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) ; Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530,
533 (1883).
29 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965) ; City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 386, 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (1954); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 378
(1938) ; Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98
Pac. 729 (1908).
30406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).

32 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
33 Ibid.
34

KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 252 (1894).
35406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
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Thus, although cases recognize that there can be an appropriation
without diversion3" they contemplate a subsequent diversion, which
is what they refer to when stating that the act evidencing the intent
7
to appropriate must be followed up with reasonable diligence.1
There are several statutory provisions which indicate that a
diversion need not always be required. Under the "Meadow Act" no
mechanical diversion was required. 38 The present Colorado statute
which succeeds that act allows persons who have used the natural
overflow of a stream for irrigation to construct ditches and claim
a priority as of the first use if the natural overflow should diminish. 9
It will be noted that, although there was no mechanical diversion
when the water was first claimed, the water left the stream. Another
Colorado statute 40 provides for the storage of water in stream beds if
the proper steps are taken to comply with measurement requirements
which insure that the reservoir owner will not encroach on the water
rights of senior appropriators. 4 ' Allowing the storage of water in
stream beds certainly indicates that at least no immediate diversion
is essential to acquire a right to water.
Even though they do not require an immediate diversion, all of
the cases and statutes discussed above, with the exception of one, 4"
contemplate a diversion in order to use the water. But the use of
water for recreation does not necessarily require a diversion for it is
often a non-consumptive use 4" which is effected while the water
remains in the stream bed. Should a diversion still be required in a
case such as this in which it is unnecessary? That there are valid
reasons for requiring a diversion cannot be denied. The diversion
helps in establishing exclusive possession; it aids in determining
the amount of water appropriated; and it gives others notice of a
prior claim to the use of the water. 4" But there are alternative
36 See note 28 supra.

37 Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794 (1885).
38 Colo. Sess. Laws 1877, § 37, at 106. For examples of cases brought under this act, see
Broad Run Investment Co. v. Devel & Snyder Improvement Co., 47 Colo. 573, 108
Pac. 755 (1910) ; Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 Pac.
1093 (1909).
39

COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-3-14 (1963).

4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-7-17 (1963).

41 A supplementary provision was added in 1965 which allows the state engineer to
order water released from reservoirs in stream beds as necessary to prevent evaporation from the reservoir from depleting the natural flow which would otherwise be
available to appropriators. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-7-17(5) (Supp. 1965).
42Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798 (Colo. 1965).

43 But note that the preservation of a water level in a stream bed or lake, and especially
in a reservoir, results in additional evaporation which must be taken into consideration. See note 41 supra.
4Comment, Developments in Colorado Water Law of Appropriation in the Last Ten
Years, 35 U. COLO. L. REv. 493, 508 (1963).
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measures that could be taken to obtain the same security without
entailing the handicap of inflexibility inherent in requiring a diversion. A Colorado statute presently gives the state engineer supervisory control over the public waters of the state with authority to
measure the flows of natural streams and to compute diversions."
Such authority coupled with a flexible permit system could provide
the necessary security of an established water right while preserving
and protecting valuable and scarce water resources.
II.

THE USE AND REGULATION OF WATER FOR RECREATION

If an appropriation of water for recreational use is allowed and
a diversion is not required, one must still face the problems of
determining when such an appropriation may be made and under
what conditions. Further, in some situations, an appropriation would
be unnecessary to regulate water use. Several hypothetical situations
must at this point be distinguished. If no daim has yet been made to
the body of water one wishes to appropriate for recreational purposes, no real problems arise, assuming appropriation for a recreational use is recognized. It is this type of situation to which the first
part of the paper has been directed. However, as soon as the preservation of water for recreation interferes with water rights previouily
acquired through appropriation, the issue of compensation is raised.
Before discussing this issue, one must distinguish between a private
use and a public use. Further, within the scope of a public use a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain must be distinguished
from regulation under the police power.
If an individual wishes to appropriate water for a recreational
use, and the water source from which the individual wants to draw
is already fully appropriated, the individual will be unable to achieve
his goal. Certainly he could buy up any water rights offered for sale,
but he cannot force a change in use to recreation. An individual
apparently has in Colorado the power to condemn a prior right to the
use of water,4" but this power is limited to the situation in which the
individual seeks to appropriate for a higher use, within the constitutional hierarchy, 4 7 than the use to which the water is currently being
put.
The state, on the other hand, has both the power of eminent
domain and the police power. It is often difficult in any given situa45

COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-11-3 (1963).
46Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 457, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (1953)

(court indicates constitutional preferences apply to individual appropriators if compensation) ; Armstrong
v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 Pac. 235 '(1891) (court disallowed
taking without compensation). For a brief discussion of preferences in Colorado, see
Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MT. 1. REv. 133, 145-47
(1955).
47
CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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tion to decide which power is being, or should be, used. The decision
is an important one for on it hinges the right to compensation. If the
state in the exercise of its power has taken the property of a citizen,
the state has exercised its power of eminent domain, and compensation for the "taking" is required. 48 On the other hand, if the state
action is merely regulatory, the act is within the police power, and
any loss to the property owner is not compensable.4 9 The problem
is in drawing the line between regulation and taking.
A. Eminent Domain
The right to the use of water, established by an appropriation,
is considered a property right 50 and thus is subject to the exercise of
the state's power of eminent domain. The Colorado Constitution
dedicated the water of natural streams to the public use and declared
the same to be the property of the public." The state has title to the
water of natural streams and therefore the right to control its use.5
But the usufructuary right5" obtained by the appropriator has been
held subject to compensation if taken under the state's power of
eminent domain. 54 In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension
Co. it was said:
That a city or town cannot take water for domestic purposes which
has been previously appropriated for some other beneficial purpose,
without fully compensating the owner, is so clear that further discussion seems almost unnecessary. 55

The issues with which this paper is concerned, within the scope of
eminent domain, are the possibility of taking water for recreational
purposes and the discovery of situations in which state action would
be considered a "taking."
It is clear that the state, or by delegation, municipal authorities,
can exercise the power of eminent domain to secure water for municipal use,56 and this is true though the prior appropriator was using
the water for domestic purposes.5 " Given the nature of the power of
48 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
49 Ibid.
50 E.g., Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 53, 279 P.2d
420, 425 (1955); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co., 106 Colo.
384, 106 P.2d 363 (1940) ; Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co.,
18 Colo. 1, 30 Pac. 1032 (1892).
51 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
52
Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 Pac. 220 (1912).
53 See Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681
54

(1922).

Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) (dictum) ; Town
of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426, 94 Pac. 339, 340
(1908).
55 42 Clo. 421,427, 94 Pac. 339, 341 (1908) (emphasis added).
56
COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-32-1(78) (1963).
57 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908)
(dictum).
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eminent domain and lack of limitation thereon, it would seem clear
that the state is not subject to the priorities of the constitution.
By statute the state has granted the power of eminent domain to
municipalities to acquire property for recreational use.5" If a city
were to consider recreation high on a list of preferred public projects
and should allocate funds to promote it, the city could condemn water
and divert it to a recreational use under its statutory power.
The state has the power of eminent domain. The next issue is
to decide when it is exercising the power and is, therefore, within the
scope of the constitutional provision requiring compensation. 9
Joseph Sax has attempted to draw the line between a taking and a
regulation by distinguishing between an economic loss resulting from
the government's enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity and a loss resulting from the government acting solely
in an arbitral capacity. 6 ° According to Sax, the former would be a
compensable taking; the latter would be a regulation within the
police power and non-compensable. Under Sax's formula, a state
agency or city acquiring water to provide a supply for domestic
municipal use or for irrigation would clearly be exercising its power
of eminent domain, if depriving a prior appropriator. 6
Preserving water for recreational use, however, does not fall so
neatly into either of Sax's categories. In most instances, the use of
water for recreation is nonconsumptive. 62 But, the preservation of
certain lake or stream levels might require different patterns of use
for other appropriators, whether up or downstream, requiring either
abstention from use during certain seasonal periods or abstention
from use which would impair the desired levels. Any action by the
state to insure the most beneficial use of the water might be seen
either as an enhancement of its resources or as the performance of
an arbitral function, depending on the viewpoint from which one
approached the problem. The decision as to which power should be
used to control the allocation of water is ultimately one for the
legislature to make.
B. The Police Power
Regulation of the use of water for recreational purposes could
be justified under the police power. The police power has often been
very broadly interpreted to allow state action to protect the health,
58

114-1-4 (1963).
CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15.
60 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964).
61See, e.g., Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) ; Town of
Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908).
62 One must recall, however, that evaporation from water stored for recreational use
could be considerable.
59

COLO. REV. STAT. §
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morals, safety and welfare of the community.6" The limitations on the
exercise of the power are few. All property is held subject to a
reasonable exercise of the police power. "4 Reasonableness requires
that legislation in exercise of the police power serve a legitimate
public purpose and bear a reasonable relationship to the desired
goal.6 5 Recognized goals, for the attainment of which the exercise
of the police power has been legitimated, include development and
conservation of a state's resources. 66
In an early case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that legislation regulating the distribution of water through irrigation canals
was within the state's police power.67 Colorado's permit system,
which applies only to underground water, is a further example of
the use of the police power to regulate the use and development of
a valuable natural resource."
Whether or not the legislature would wish to exercise the power
it possesses will depend on several factors, e.g., the extent of benefit
to the public, the quantity and quality of harm to the individual
property owner, and alternative methods of achieving the same goal.
As to the court's position, one writer has stated that in light of the
Colorado court's liberal attitude toward the exercise of the police
power and its restricted view of the power of the court to challenge
regulatory legislation, "Colorado must be listed among the states
which would uphold any extensive regulation of water resources."6 "
CONCLUSION

Colorado has important interests, both in the tourist industry70
and in the health and welfare of .tcitizens, to consider in making
any decision as to the best method of preserving a limited and
valuable resource. The state also has an obligation under its constitution to protect the vested water right of an appropriator. Perhaps
63 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395

(1926). For an excellent analysis of the scope of the police power, see King, Regulation of Water Rights Under the Police Power, in UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CENTER, WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 271
(1958).

64Thiele v. City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957).
65 King, op. cit. supra note 63, at 282.
66
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 430 (1936); Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 534 (1895) ; Maitland v. People, 93 Colo. 59, 23 P.2d 116 (1933).
67
White v. Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co., 22 Colo. 191, 43 Pac. 1028
(1896).
68
COLO. REV.STAT. § 148-18-1 to -15 (Supp. 1965).
69 King, op. cit. supra note 63, at 318-19.
70 According to a January 1967 report of The Colorado Visitors Bureau, 7,142,105 visitors came to Colorado in 1966 and spent $555,478,354. These figures can be compared
to a total of 6,287,755 visitors in 1965 who spent $499,782,666. If these increases,
exceeding 10% in one year, continue, the need for water for recreation will also
increase.
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one possibility of achieving a balance between these interests in time
of conflict would be the adoption of a permit system to regulate the
use of surface waters.
The ideal system of water law has been stated to consist of the
following elements: (1) the system should encourage the development of water resources toward the optimum benefits of a limited
resource; (2) the system should provide security to the water user for
his investment; (3) the system should permit flexibility; and (4) the
system should protect public interests in the water against waste and
for use for navigation, fishing, and recreation. 7 A permit system
could be designed that would aid in approximating the listed goals
including the promotion of a recreational use of water. Obviously
no system should have as its central theme the preservation of water
for recreation. All systems, given the scarcity of a resource, should
aim primarily at obtaining the maximum beneficial use of that limited
resource. The latter goal will, even if only incidentally, promote the
former. Given the fact that a recreational use is relatively non-consumptive, the recreational use to that extent would add to the benefit
derived from the water.
A meaningful permit system must allow an administrative
agency to view an individual's request for the use of water in comparison with other competing uses and in light of the overall quantity
of a limited resource. The greatest problem in creating a useful permit
system is deciding what standards to set as a framework for the
administrative agency's decision as to what constitutes the "best"
use of water at any given time. One way in which to make such a
decision less crucial, and at the same time to make the permitted use
of water more flexible and more able to meet changing needs and
priorities, would be to limit the duration of a permit. If, for example,
a certain lake now holds more than sufficient water to provide for
recreational use, it would be wise to permit the use of at least some
portion of the water elsewhere. If the time should come when the
level of water in the lake is seriously impaired, and the most beneficial use is declared to be the preservation of the lake, a change in
use patterns would be required at the expiration of the permit.
A permit system could be very significant in preserving water
for recreational use if the legislature were to declare that use to be
of high priority as a matter of public policy. The legislative declaration would weight recreation heavily in any administrative choice
as to the preferred use of water at any given time.
71Trelease, Desirable Revisions of Western Water Law, RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT:
FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 203, 204 (Western Resources Conf. 1960).
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It should also be noted, assuming a permit system is adopted,7"
that the regulation of water through the use of the permit system
is an exercise of the police power and would not result in the need
for compensation. The need to compensate could, however, be built
into the permit system if such a result were desired. The statute
could require reasonable payment for any change in use at the
expiration of the permit, thus forcing the individual who can put
the water to a more beneficial use to compensate the individual who
is to lose his permit. It would be hoped that equity could be built
into the permit system, for example, by allowing a permit to last
long enough to permit a reasonable return on an original investment,
without requiring compensation as uses change. The latter could
force a recreational use, which has an inestimable non-monetary
value, out of the system to the extent it is a consumptive use.
The adoption of the permit system would, hopefully, incorporate both flexibility and certainty into Colorado water law. No solution
to a water use problem can guarantee both absolute flexibility and
absolute certainty. Where the objectives conflict, each must give
somewhat to achieve a desired balance. In the past, certainty has
been emphasized. To preserve water for recreational use more flexibility is required than we now have.
Constance Hauver

questions might arise as to the constitutionality of a permit system as applied to
surface waters in Colorado, considering the constitutional provisions set forth at the
beginning of this paper. These questions cannot be addressed in the limited scope of
this note. For an excellent analysis demonstrating the constitutionality of extensive
regulation of a constitutionally created right to water, see King, op. cit. supra note 63.
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